3186 - Cái chết của Saif al-Islam Gaddafi đánh dấu sự kết thúc của một kỷ nguyên chính trị ở Libya
Saif al-Islam có rất ít ảnh hưởng đến việc điều hành nhà nước hiện tại. Nhưng sự hiện diện của ông vẫn là một mối đe dọa chính trị và tiềm tàng về quân sự đối với các đối thủ của ông.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/killing-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-end-political-era-libya
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The killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is the end of a political era in Libya
Saif al-Islam wielded little influence over the current running of the state. But his presence was still a political and potentially military threat to his rivals.
Image — Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, pictured in the Libyan capital Tripoli in August 2011. (Photo credit IMED LAMLOUM/AFP via Getty Images)
On Tuesday 3 February, news broke of the killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Four assailants reportedly entered his compound in the city of Zintan and shot him dead. The events resemble a murder mystery drama.
Rumours abound over the perpetrators of the killing and their motivations. Where does this fit politically – is it connected to negotiations over a new government? Or a dispute over national reconciliation talks? Is this the result of a local feud within the city of Zintan? Or could national players have been involved?
Both the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, and the family of Khalifa Haftar, which dominates the east and south of the country, stand to benefit from Saif’s death. But no one has claimed responsibility for the act: doing so could result in potential retribution. So what does the killing say about Libya in 2026? And what are the implications?
A symbol of an alternative path for Libya
Saif al-Islam was the heir apparent of his father, longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi. He had been at the centre of Libyan politics since the 2000s, when he spearheaded a reform movement to liberalize the Libyan state. That effort was seen as counter to his father’s political philosophy by many of the true believers in the so-called ‘Green’ camp. Some believed that Saif’s programme had undermined the regime and contributed to its demise.
The pivotal moment came for Saif in 2011 when he addressed the nation as the uprising against his father’s rule gathered momentum. Faced with the choice of advocating de-escalation or a call to arms, Saif chose the latter. His words that day have nonetheless reverberated in the minds of Libyans. He predicted a collapse of the Libyan economy, foreign occupation and ‘rivers of blood’.
Even for supporters of the revolution, many elements of Saif’s prophecy have come to pass. Dissatisfaction with the parlous state of the country has led some, who wouldn’t consider themselves supporters of the regime, to sympathize with his plight and to ask: were the choices made in 2011 the right ones?
Reactions to his death ranged, from celebration for the death of a tyrant, to anger that a future national leader had been killed. In this sense, Saif personified the lack of confidence and anxiety Libyans feel for their own futures.
There are also more practical implications emerging from Saif’s death.
The end of the ‘Greens’ as a collective
Saif al-Islam was the only figure who could coalesce the ‘Green’ constituency – a range of actors from broad pro-Gaddafi communities in cities such as Sirte, Bani Walid and Sebha to former regime-aligned elites in security and government. Their significance as a political force has been a regular source of debate. But there is little dispute that Saif al-Islam is the only figure that could have united them.
With their forces defeated on the ground, Gaddafi’s ‘men of the tent’ went into exile, were imprisoned, or forged new alliances. Both Tripoli and Benghazi-based authorities have long sought to re-integrate former regime political and intelligence figures to court the elite Green constituency. The death of Saif does not really shift these dynamics.
The Greens have continued to undertake some collective action in discussions, most notably over internationally mediated reconciliation efforts. But these are sporadic and have no clear tangible results.
The removal of a political obstacle
Saif al-Islam’s real threat to his opponents came in the form of his potential to influence, rather than his current influence. After all, at the time of his death he was largely confined to a house in Zintan. In the end, he was not safe even there.
But things were very different in 2021, when Saif’s return to the political scene caused a political earthquake. Rivals feared that Saif could win elections, or at the very least exert meaningful influence over any new government as a kingmaker. His entry into the presidential elections that year was one of the reasons those elections never took place.
There was…a sense that should elections be announced, Saif would re-emerge from the shadows and present a renewed threat.
Since then, Saif has played no meaningful role in Libyan political life. He had no political infrastructure, nor has he been active in seeking to forge political alliances.
But there was nonetheless a sense that should elections be announced, Saif would re-emerge from the shadows and present a renewed threat. Political opponents would have worried that he might take votes not only from supporters of the former regime, but also those fed up with the current state of affairs. His removal lessens those fears.
A future threat to the Haftars
A decade ago, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), led by Khalifa Haftar, began outreach to military commanders that fought under the former regime. That was part of a strategy to consolidate control over central and southern Libya.
Pro-Gaddafi constituencies have formed a key part of the LAAF ever since and have been critical to its control of territory. Yet, since the political return of Saif al-Islam in 2021, the Haftars have become fearful that these elements could break away and align with Saif should the opportunity arise.
That threat would likely grow when Khalifa Haftar, the octogenarian family patriarch, dies. His likely successor, son Saddam, may have struggled to compete for loyalty in the face of a challenge from Saif al-Islam.
The LAAF has been reorganizing its forces to place them under the direct control of the Haftar family: a key example is the breakup of the 128 Brigade headed by a pro-Gaddafi family, the Zadmas. The killing of Saif will ease these efforts and likely leave pro-Gaddafi constituencies with a choice of remaining aligned with the Haftars or switching allegiance to the GNU.
Prospects
Ultimately, Saif’s killing is likely to stoke some retribution from his supporters, particularly if the perpetrators (and their sponsors) are revealed. But this is not likely to shift the balance nationally. Rather it seems like it further entrenches the pattern of consolidation of power within Libya.
The number of powerful armed actors has been declining – a prominent militia leader was slain in Tripoli last year – and the Haftars in particular have been entrenching their domination in areas under their control.
The note of caution is that this process is functioning through coercion rather than consensus. This makes the buy-in of the population limited, at best, and therefore more fragile. As such, consolidation should not be mistaken for stability.
Tim Eaton Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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