2846 - Tổng thống Zelenskiy tổ chức họp báo tại Mar-a-Lago ở Palm Beach, Florida, ngày 28 tháng 12 năm 2025
Samuel Charap and Jennifer Kavanagh
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/12/in-ukraine-is-the-us-promising-too-much.html
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Photo by Jonathan Ernst/Reuters
Zelenskiy hold a press conference at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, December 28, 2025
This commentary was originally published by the Washington Post on December 26, 2025.
As the Trump administration pushes ahead with intensive negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war, it has surprised even its harshest critics by reportedly putting on the table a set of security guarantees for Ukraine that are more far-reaching than anything proposed by prior administrations.
On Wednesday, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Washington has offered to “provide Ukraine with ‘Article 5-like’ guarantees” as part of a deal to end the war. “If Russia invades Ukraine, a coordinated military response will be launched,” he said. Though some of the details remain vague, the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding document, suggests that the United States would treat a future Russian attack on Ukraine as an attack on itself and respond accordingly, including possibly with the direct deployment of U.S. military forces. According to the terms under discussion, this guarantee would be ratified by the Senate and made legally binding.
But those celebrating this turn of events should hold off on the champagne toasts. There’s a problem with the emerging plan: It promises too much.
It is easy to understand why Ukraine would be enthusiastic about this offer. However, this supposed “platinum standard” guarantee, in the words of one senior U.S. official, comes with important and underappreciated risks not only for Kyiv and Washington, but also for U.S. allies in Europe and beyond. Putting aside the question of whether Russia would accept it, there are three major challenges to making such a broad commitment.
There’s a problem with the emerging plan: It promises too much.
First is the complicated question of credibility. If putting U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine was necessary to protect vital U.S. interests, they would have been there years ago. Instead, three successive presidents—Barack Obama, Joe Biden and Donald Trump—have declined to send American soldiers to defend Ukraine, a clear indication that they assess the U.S. stakes to be too low to warrant the costs and risks of war with the possessor of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
Advocates of extending an Article 5-style security guarantee to Ukraine claim that it is the lack of a treaty commitment that has kept U.S. forces at home. Historical evidence suggests otherwise: The U.S. has never hesitated to deploy its military abroad when it perceives a direct threat to U.S. interests. The U.S. did not have a formal security treaty with Kuwait when it intervened to liberate the country from Iraqi invaders, nor did it have an obligation to defend South Korea when it sent troops there in 1950.
Any commitment made to Ukraine that obligates the U.S. to act differently in the future than it has in the past would be a promise of questionable value for deterring future Russian aggression. Proponents point out that Russia has thus far refrained from testing NATO. But prior U.S. unwillingness to fight for Ukraine colors any future commitments to do so. If Russian President Vladimir Putin perceives strategic gains from calling what he may see as a U.S. bluff, he just might do it.
Second, if the U.S. made an Article 5-type commitment to Ukraine and did not honor it, that would raise questions about the reliability of all similar U.S. guarantees, undermining the security and confidence of key allies in Europe and Asia. Even if Russia did not test the U.S. by invading Ukrainian territory for a third time, U.S. credibility would be badly damaged. If Washington extends one guarantee that it appears unlikely to uphold, allies and adversaries alike would have legitimate doubts about the strength and dependability of other U.S. commitments.
It is therefore counterintuitive that some NATO members are pushing hard for Ukraine to receive expansive security guarantees from the U.S.; their security would be undermined if Washington ultimately agrees to provide them. Still dependent on the U.S. military for their defense, European allies should fear anything that would weaken the credibility of NATO’s own Article 5 guarantee and its ability to deter potential Russian aggression.
The third and perhaps most important reason that Washington should refrain from offering Kyiv an Article 5-type commitment is the core reality of what that obligation implies: a readiness to go to war with Russia over Ukraine. While no U.S. security guarantee absolutely requires the deployment of U.S. military forces, if the U.S. were to make a similar commitment to Ukraine and deterrence were to fail, Washington would face significant political pressure to follow through by sending U.S. soldiers to the front line. At that point, the U.S. would be at war with Russia, an outcome that would include the potential for nuclear escalation.
"Any commitment made to Ukraine that obligates the U.S. to act differently in the future than it has in the past would be a promise of questionable value for deterring future Russian aggression."
Supporters of providing Article 5-like commitments to Ukraine argue that the possibility of nuclear escalation cuts both ways and could deter Russian aggression against Ukraine. But Moscow has demonstrated that it is willing to bear far higher costs and risks than Washington when it comes to Ukraine, putting the U.S. at an insurmountable disadvantage in any future confrontation, including nuclear brinkmanship.
Ukraine will need security guarantees as part of any deal that ends the war. But the Trump administration should prioritize narrow but credible commitments—more similar to what the U.S. and its allies have been willing to do for Ukraine over the past four years—over expansive ones that seem generous but are ultimately hollow and potentially dangerous.
Samuel Charap is distinguished chair in Russia and Eurasia Policy at RAND. Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.
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